INTRODUCTION
Judicial supremacy is the new judicial review. From the time Alexander Bickel introduced the term "countermajoritarian difficulty" in 19621 until very recently, justifying judicial authority to strike down legislation in a nation committed to democratic self-government was the central problem of constitutional theory. But many who had satisfied themselves as to the legitimacy of judicial review have since taken up the related but distinct question of whether, though legitimate, constitutional interpretation should be the exclusive province of the judiciary. That is, is it ever appropriate to locate constitutional interpretive authority outside of constitutional courts, whether within the coordinate branches of government or the citizenry more generally?
Recent attacks on judicial supremacy, mostly from the academic left, have sought to debunk the strongest form of the proposition that the Constitution means whatever the Supreme Court says it means. Thus, Larry Kramer traces the history of popular constitutionalism as a bulwark against the robust vision of judicial supremacy advanced by the Warren Court in cases like Cooper v. Aaron.' Reva Siegel and Robert Post denounce the "juricentricity" of the Rehnquist Court, which they say should have been more attentive to the contributions of political culture to constitutional meaning. 3 Mark Tushnet argues provocatively that citizens and public officials should disregard Supreme Court constitutional pronouncements that conflict with their reasonable conceptions of what he calls the "thin" Constitution. 4 And Jeremy Waldron suggests that in modern liberal democracies, judicial review is vastly inferior to the legislative process at setting questions of rights. ' There is an irony in all this rending of tunics over judicial power. Popular constitutionalists believe that the people themselves should play an active role
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2. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (083), "declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system"); see LARRY in constitutional elaboration. But the place of federal judges within our system is itself of constitutional dimension. Our federal judges are creatures of the Constitution, their duties mandated in the rather bare terms of Article III and the scope of their power answerable to the people in their exercise of higher lawmaking. Settling the role of the federal judiciary vis-t-vis other political institutions is a matter of what Keith Whittington has called "constitutional construction," the ongoing creation of the Constitution's meaning through "the political melding of the document with external interests and principles." 6 Constitutional construction is sympathetic with the popular turn in constitutional theory, describing as it does the process by which constitutional ambiguity is resolved outside the courts by nonjudicial actors.
On the very terms of the debate to which popular constitutionalists have rightly steered scholarly attention, the fact that judicial supremacy was frowned upon in ages past should not, then, be sufficient reason to displace it today. Rather, we must evaluate the institution of judicial supremacy as a product of constitutional construction and according to the criteria that a privileging of dynamic and popular construction demands. Judges are not supreme just because they say so, but neither are they subordinate just because legal academics say they should be. An attack on judicial supremacy is an act of political advocacy, not a declaration of truth; assessing the normative argument requires us to ask why others appear to accept the institution, whether that acceptance is adequately informed, and whether it is premised on an attractive conception of state power. Only after understanding the underexplained appeal of judicial supremacy to those outside the judiciary may we assess its theoretical bona fides and, as appropriate, either mourn or celebrate its ascension.
Digging to the roots of that appeal is yeoman's work, though, and other political actors must have reasons for allowing the Court to 'win."' 9 Whittington argues that members of the elected branches, and presidents in particular, historically have bolstered and sustained judicial supremacy in order to conserve their own political resources. As Part I explains, Whittington excels at what I call the microtheory part of his project: his description of elected officials' incentives to prop up the judiciary-whether as a means of enforcing political commitments against opposition forces, circumventing veto gates, or delegating decision-making authority on issues of low political return. Whittington's book is structured, however, around a macrotheory that proves far less persuasive. Whittington relies on a taxonomy of presidential types that situates administrations along a spectrum from the "reconstructive" presidencies of men such as Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt; to presidents who are "affiliated" with an orthodox political regime, such as William Howard Taft and Lyndon Johnson; to "oppositional" presidents like Grover Cleveland and Bill Clinton who, through coalition-building, come to power despite being out of step with the ideological commitments of the dominant regime. Differently situated presidents face different sets of political incentives, which influence their relative support for judicial supremacy. Only in reconstructive presidencies, which are rare, can we expect to see a fullthroated attack on the Court's ultimate interpretive authority.' 0 It would be too strong to say that I reject this model. It may well be that, at least in retrospect, one can array presidents along something like Whittington's spectrum, and in order to understand fully the reality of nested opposition between the judiciary and elected officials, one certainly needs to tell a story about relative levels of political capital. But as Part II discusses, Whittington fails to demonstrate that his taxonomy bears any necessary relation to the growth or survival of judicial supremacy, a subject central to his project but which he too often elides with judicial affection. Ours is a constitutional history rife with interbranch conflict, no less so in recent years than early on, and yet the strong secular trend since at least the end of the Civil War is growing support for judicial supremacy among elected officials, judges themselves, and large numbers of citizens more generally. Showing any one of these buttresses to be "foundational" is an ambitious undertaking that Whittington fails to pull off.
In truth, Whittington devotes little space to defending the view that institutional political support is uniquely necessary to judicial supremacy. His writing is tactical, his composition admirably precise. Pigeonholing broad 9. Id.
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swaths of history into narrow and contestable conclusions does not seem to suit Whittington's intellectual temperament. But the cost of responsible inquiry is relevance, and I wonder how far Whittington has advanced the ball toward understanding the origins of judicial supremacy. As Part III discusses, the thickness of our reliance on judicial supremacy suggests roots both deeper and more diffuse than systematic political expediency can supply. Courts are part of a collective self-conception that includes an institutional commitment to justice and individual rights; they serve as a form of political insurance for both systematic and occasional political losers; they provide a measure of predictability that assists us in ordering our personal and professional affairs; and they figure in the expedient resolution of values debates that cannot be sorted out through the retail political process. The relative stability of our particular form of constitutional politics should motivate us to ask not whether judicial supremacy is a correct understanding of the role judges should play in our system, but instead, whether it is a valuable one. To answer that question, the political foundations of judicial supremacy to which we must attend are not our presidents' motives but our own.
I. THE POLITICAL UTILITY OF COURTS
It is dangerous, not just to us but to them as well, for politicians to have too much power. With authority, alas, comes discretion, which is not always helpful in trying to run a government. Consider the following. On August 17, 1961, defectors diverted a Russian-bound Cuban merchant boat, the Bahia de Nipe, and received permission to dock in Lynnhaven, Virginia. 1 The next day, libels were filed against the vessel by various individuals and businesses that had unsatisfied claims against the Cuban government, which owned the boat. In response, Cuba requested, via a communiqu6 to the State Department, that the United States recognize its right to sovereign immunity and return the vessel to Cuba. 2 The Bahia de Nipe arrived in U.S. territory barely a year after the Bay of Pigs invasion and at the end of two weeks of diplomatic negotiations for the return of a hijacked U.S. airplane that had been diverted to Havana. The plane had been secured in exchange for the release of a Cuban patrol boat that was being held in Key West. 3 Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Ford all had incentives to give to the judiciary a foreign affairs power that the Court had previously sought to disclaim. And although the Supreme Court has described grants of sovereign
25.

See ERNEST K. BANKAS, THE STATE IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 94
(2005) (calling court application of the restrictive theory "cumbersome and elusive"). The drafters of the FSIA intentionally left vague the definition of "commercial activity" in order that the courts might develop standards on their own in a common law fashion. See Hearing, supra note 24, at 53 (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State) ("We realize that we probably could not draft legislation which would satisfactorily delineate [the] line of demarcation between commercial and governmental. We therefore thought it was the better part of valor to recognize our inability to do that definitively and to leave it to the courts with very modest guidance."). Because preemptive presidents lack a stable base of support and often preside over a divided government, they lack the political capital to challenge the Court's constitutional authority directly. 33 But on Whittington's telling, their support for judicial supremacy is not just defensive. The Supreme Court is notoriously slow to embrace institutional change; if the Senate is the nation's cooling saucer, the Court is its refrigerator. Constitutional law is existentially predisposed to maintaining commitments over time, 4 The Court's relative insulation from quotidian politics provides additional incentive for affiliated presidents and other elected officials in effect to delegate decision making to the judiciary. Whittington argues that members of Congress are generally less likely than presidents to launch conspicuous assaults on judicial supremacy, 4 and he identifies instances in which political expediency counsels deference to the third branch. Elected officials can take positions and make decisions on popular elements of their political program and allow the Court to make decisions on less popular or lower visibility issues. This is, of course, a matter of simple posturing, whereby Congress bats political hot potatoes across First Street, voting for or not strongly opposing legislation that it hopes will be struck down, but it is also a matter of conserving valuable political energy. 43 Consider the growing prevalence of statutory provisions for expedited Supreme Court review, which the Court recently described as "responding to a congressional concern that if a provision of the statute is declared invalid there is an interest in prompt adjudication by this Court." 44 Such provisions were added to statutes such as the Flag Protection Act and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to enable skeptical legislators to hold their noses and vote for popular bills that they opposed on constitutional or even partisan grounds. advertising" in the expectation that "the courts will resolve these legitimate legal questions as appropriate under the law").
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finality of judicial review thereby streamlines the business of the political branches. This redounds to the benefit of an affiliated leader and his congressional allies, who may then devote more resources to enacting and taking credit for other aspects of their agenda.4 6 Robert Dahl argues in his well-known essay on judicial decision making that "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." 47 The rightness of that hypothesis as stated depends on one's definition of "long," but it is correct in any event if we regard "never" as hyperbole. Given the usual affinity of judges for the dominant regime, it makes sense that affiliated leaders would seek to share power with them. Governance takes time and energy, and judges have a different and useful set of resources to offer. uite unlike Congress, their decisions require the assent of one, or two, or at most five, and so often can be predicted with confidence and implemented with relatively little to-do. 48 As an impetuous sibling seeks comfort in parental arbitration, elected officials may use the judiciary to validate their side of political debates. 49 And as the FSIA example illustrates, delegation to the courts helps political actors resist the siren song of political expediency in favor of long-term commitments that are more valuable in the end.°N early every president may be characterized as either preemptive or affiliated in Whittington's taxonomy, and so nearly every president has found himself frequently in a position to affirm judicial supremacy. But every now and again a president carries a mandate for a new political order. The regimes against which the others are defined-those that other leaders are either affiliated with or opposed to-must themselves be created by what Whittington, here relying expressly on Skowronek, calls "reconstructive" presidencies: those of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and to a lesser degree, Reagan. The authority of reconstructive regimes is "rooted in antagonism to existing commitments, allowing them to gain prestige precisely through their efforts to shatter the inherited constitutional order."" 1 In terms more familiar to legal scholars, reconstructive presidencies are the stuff "constitutional moments" are made of, when "[a]s a result of many electoral According to Whittington, reconstructive presidents alone have both the will and the power to challenge the Court's interpretive authority. The courts are not just part of the ancien r6gime but might indeed be partly responsible for the revolutionary condition. A recalcitrant Court might "push[] forward with its inherited and evolving political agenda even in the face of increasing tensions within the dominant political coalition." 3 Court intransigence may help provoke a robust demonstration of political power-witness the 1936 electoral landslide, which cemented the authority of Roosevelt's essentially populist, antibusiness New Deal coalition and emboldened the President to propose his Court-packing legislation. 4 Constitutional change is typically part of the reconstructive enterprise, making conflict with the Court inevitable.
Perhaps the boldest instance of such conflict is Jackson's 1832 veto of the rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States, in which he dismissed McCulloch v. Maryland 55 as just one man's opinion:
The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. legislative supremacy and his effort to remake the nation in his own anti-elite image. 5 9 Everything judges do is paid for or enforced by political actors. Jackson was conspicuously aware of the implications of that dependency, but most presidents prefer not to dwell on it. 6° Instead, the exigencies of political life lead them to participate in and reinforce a political ethos of judicial supremacy. Members of Congress also participate, lacking the bully pulpit or the unity of purpose necessary to stake a credible claim to legislative supremacy. 6, Whittington's valuable contribution is to emphasize and elaborate upon the very good reasons why the departmentalist claims celebrated by some proponents of popular constitutionalism are the exception, not the rule of American politics.
Whittington is of the "regime politics" tradition in political science, which long ago rejected the idea that judicial behavior may be usefully explained without a full accounting of the pressures that the rest of the polity exerts on judges. 6 2 Thinking of judges as autonomous Herculean actors who exist to stem the tides of popular will does not get us far toward understanding why they make the decisions they do. Rather, and indisputably, courts are semiautonomous political instruments whose activities are "one of many means politicians and political movements employ when seeking to make their constitutional visions the law of the land." 6 , Whittington capably demonstrates that no single thread runs through the various reasons politicians like judicial supremacy. Understanding why a particular President finds comfort in the judiciary at a particular historical moment requires identifying his place in what Skowronek has called "political time" -the state of the relationship 5g-See id. at 6o-6i. 6o. Historians disagree whether Jackson threatened not to enforce any injunction that might be issued (and never was) in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831 between the President's own interests and commitments and the ideological landscape in which he comes to power. 6 4 This must be right, and indeed (as with most great insights) feels rather obvious in retrospect.
I. THE GROWTH OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Whittington wants to do more, though, than simply explain the phenomenon of support for judicial supremacy by elected officials. Had he titled his book "Political Acquiescence in Judicial Supremacy," it would have been shorter, less interesting, and more successful. But to tell a story of creation, as is Whittington's ambition, he must make the case that the support of institutional actors is not just consistent with judicial supremacy but is in fact responsible for it. This he has not done. His observations about the motivations of political actors to preserve judicial independence are incisive, at times brilliant, but he does not make the link between political support for judges and the inception, growth, or continuing health of the institution of judicial supremacy.
Let's begin where we left off, with reconstructive presidencies. Whittington rightly argues that the strongest reconstructive presidents are best-situated to make departmentalist claims. "Reconstructive presidents are notable for their expansive authority to remake the political environment in their own image," he says, "resolving conflict through their own political actions rather than through judicial dictate. 6, It should follow, then, that judicial supremacy as an institution is at its low ebb during reconstructive periods. Indeed, Whittington says as much: "Judicial authority to define constitutional meaning is likely to be weakest when contested by presidents armed with such a powerful mandate., 66 Likely to be, perhaps, but is it? This book does not make the case.
The relationship between presidential reservations of interpretive authority and the prosperity of judicial supremacy as an institution is complicated and difficult to measure. The Court itself is likely to respond to a weak strategic position by avoiding conflict with the political branches. Conflict avoidance might take the form of resort to manipulable prudential mechanisms like ripeness, standing, or the political question doctrine; it might be reflected in docket control, particularly in the post-1925 Public confidence in the Court rose dramatically into the 1850S. 74 Wrote Charles Warren of the antebellum years, "While there were extremists and radicals in both parties ... who inveighed against it and its decisions, yet the general mass of the public and the Bar had faith in its impartiality and its ability. ' 
The departmentalist positions of later reconstructive Presidents Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Reagan were progressively more timid. Indeed the last two are better described as capitulating to the Court's interpretive authority. Judicial supremacy has seen better days than the Civil War, of course. Lincoln had announced during the Lincoln-Douglas debates that he did not regard Dred Scott as constitutional precedent, s4 and in 1862, Congress prohibited slavery in the federal territories, in derogation of the case's second holding. 8 Lincoln later ignored Taney's decision in Ex parte Merryman declaring invalid Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 8 6 At least two additional points about Lincoln's relationship to the Court are relevant to our discussion, however. First, Lincoln's claims about Dred Scott rejected not the decision itself but its status as a binding precedent. "We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we, Lincoln's reluctance to launch a full-frontal assault on the Court's authority surely reflects the strength of the third branch's claim to interpretive prominence. 9 "
It is odd, second, to declare that either the Court's general weakness during the Civil War or its relative strength compared to earlier Courts resulted primarily from varying levels of support by the executive or the legislature. Dred Scott itself deserves credit for the former. Capturing the mood in some segments of the country, the New York Daily Tribune wrote two days after the decision was handed down that "[i]f epithets and denunciation could sink a judicial body, the Supreme Court of the United States would never be heard of again."'" President Buchanan and a large chunk of the country supported the decision, 9 " but they were drowned out first by a momentous presidential election and then by force of arms. in the 185Os and 186os was determined by the dynamics of public confidence in the Court's decisions, not by the institutional needs of Congress and the executive. Something changed with the Civil War. After striking down two federal statutes in the first seventy years of its existence, through Dred Scott, the Court struck down fifty-eight in the next seventy. 93 What explains the Court's swagger? Others have noted that explanations are wanting for the gradual rise of judicial supremacy during Reconstruction. 94 I doubt very much, though, that it has anything to do with the dearth of reconstructive presidencies over that period. To be fair, Whittington does not make that claim, at least not explicitly, but it is difficult to understand the implications of his macrotheory without it.
Whittington of course includes Franklin Delano Roosevelt in his pantheon of reconstructive presidents, but Roosevelt's impact on judicial supremacy is murky. Roosevelt was frustrated by the Court's disagreement with his constitutional vision, but he conspicuously avoided challenging the Court's interpretive authority or seeking to limit its jurisdiction. Marian McKenna counts more than one hundred legislative proposals offered by Roosevelt's congressional allies in early 1936 seeking to limit judicial power, including proposals to restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction, to require a supermajority vote to invalidate acts of Congress, and to eliminate entirely the Court's power to invalidate federal legislation. 9 Roosevelt concluded, however, that the Court's makeup, not its authority, was the problem. Regarding the response of the Administration (of which he was part) to proposals to restrict the Court's appellate review, Robert Jackson wrote, "[N]either the President nor his advisers were prepared to go to such lengths. Deep as was their dissatisfaction, they felt it was men, not the institution, that needed correction." Roosevelt's refusal to attack the Court's institutional authority directly, and the subsequent failure of his Court-packing plan, are a remarkable testament to the Court's strength and a challenge to Whittington's macrotheory of reconstructive presidencies. Indeed, no sitting president since-whether reconstructive or not-has actually challenged the finality of the Court's interpretive authority. Even Reagan, who did not conceal his hostility to the constitutional decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts, caved to judicial supremacy. Early in Reagan's presidency, the Justice Department backed a series of court-stripping measures, including failed proposals to limit federal court jurisdiction over school prayer, 98 busing, 99 and abortion°° cases and to repeal the incorporation doctrine, the exclusionary rule, and federal question jurisdiction in the district courts. 1 "' But Reagan and Attorney General Edwin Meese eventually settled on a strategy of promoting a jurisprudence of original intent."' Unable to muster the support needed to muzzle the Court's interpretive voice (even within the Administration), 0 3 the Reagan Justice Department sought instead to change the Court's tune. Meese's originalism strategy, like Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, was not just unopposed to judicial supremacy, but in fact was premised on it. Appointing originalists to the federal bench as a central plank of a political strategy assumes that the way to bring the courts in line is not to challenge them but to staff them properly. These are inconvenient facts for someone seeking to demonstrate that the origins of judicial supremacy lie in the support of the political branches. Reconstructive presidents were to be our control group, after all. If they cannot serve that function, we must look elsewhere to establish a connection between political support and the advent and growth of judicial supremacy. The prevalence of jurisdiction-stripping bills might be one promising avenue. Even if it appears that disaffected presidents such as Roosevelt and Reagan were capitulating as much as other presidents to the Court's interpretive supremacy, perhaps we can measure the political branches' relative support for judicial supremacy by assessing how hard Congress has tried to take it away. Here the record is mixed. Reconstructive presidencies have indeed been accompanied by legislative attempts to limit the Court's jurisdiction over certain constitutional questions. Roosevelt's and Reagan's administrations saw conspicuous court-stripping efforts, and the most famous such measure -the partial repeal of the Court's appellate jurisdiction in order to affect the disposition of Ex parte McCardle' 0 4 -came as part of the reconstructive program started by Lincoln and continued by the Reconstruction Congresses.' And the fact that the court-stripping measures during the Roosevelt and Reagan administrations failed-most do-does not in itself indicate relative support for judicial supremacy. We will instead want to know how the level of court-stripping activity compares to other, nonreconstructive periods. If the political branches were no less sanguine about court stripping during affiliated and oppositional presidencies, then it is difficult to make confident claims about the relative strength of judicial supremacy during those periods.1" 6 Historically, though, court-curbing rashes have hardly been unique to reconstructive eras. As Gerald Gunther wrote, "Jurisdiction-curbing proposals have surfaced in Congress in virtually every period of controversial federal court decisions."' 07 Following Cohens v. Virginia, ' 8 There is political sense in this rarity. In 1965 David Easton introduced the concept of "diffuse support" into the political science lexicon. 19 Diffuse support refers to the "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members [of a political system] to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants"; diffuse support sits in opposition to "specific support," which "flows from the favorable attitudes and predisposition stimulated by outputs that are perceived by members to meet their demands as they arise or in anticipation." 2 ' We should expect agreement with the substantive holdings of the Supreme Court to determine specific support but to have only an indirect bearing on diffuse support. 2 ' The data show that diffuse support for the Court, and in particular support for a robust power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, achieves consistent and stable majorities. 2 As Larry Alexander and Lawrence Solum have written, "the idea that the judicial branch should act as the final and authoritative interpreter of the Constitution has been a profoundly popular one." ' 23 The evidence is shaky that the general favor of presidents is primarily or even significantly generative of our ethos of judicial supremacy or that 
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reconstructive presidents' relative lack of support for judicial supremacy has itself resulted in less judicial independence. More probably, reconstructive periods and episodes of weak judicial authority have jointly resulted from popular dissatisfaction with a prior regime. On this view, judicial supremacy has been threatened not by popular presidents but by unpopular judicial decisions. It likewise has been buoyed by the support of the people, not their politicians."
III. THE PEOPLE'S COURT?
This Review has hypothesized that members of the public, more than institutional political actors, have laid the foundations for judicial supremacy. This is a difference of degree, of course, and it resists empirical assessment. Whittington must be right that the support of most presidents most of the time matters, and indeed may be necessary, to the survival of judicial supremacy. To that extent, his detailed accounting of that support is helpful to the many seeking to better understand the phenomenon. But I doubt he is answering the most interesting question about judicial supremacy. Justice Scalia gets to the heart of the matter: why would we "want to leave these enormously important social questions to nine lawyers with no constraints? " 12 Whittington has told us why politicians support judicial supremacy. 
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Whittington acknowledges the limited scope of his project: "Whereas this book has focused on the actions and words of elite political actors, public opinion scholars have emphasized the potential value of diffuse support in the mass public for shoring up the judiciary....
[T]he account offered here suggests one way in which courts have won that diffuse support." WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 289; cf. id. at 102 ("Judges are subject to many of the same shifts in public mood and political and social circumstances that affect elected officials.").
If we wish, the outputs here may be considered psychic or symbolic and in this sense, they may offer the individual immediate benefits strong enough to stimulate a supportive response. Members may get satisfaction, for example, from the promise of future greatness for their system and even some gratification from being made to feel an important part of a larger historical process that calls for present restraint on behalf of future benefits for the political system, an object which they come to identify in and for itself. 127
Even granting that presidents and legislatures effectively convey the narrow political preferences of majorities in the here and now, those institutions may be ill-suited to respond to values that are less temporally contingent. ' First, many of us might believe it particularly important to devote institutional resources to developing and sustaining a justice ethic. Courts might get all sorts of questions wrong, and they might do so often, but the federal judiciary's commitment in constitutional cases is to achieving outcomes that are consistent with the Constitution. That commitment is unique among the branches, the other two of which (quite properly) serve political and constitutional masters alike. Most of us believe, moreover, that constitutional guarantees are generally consistent with justice.' 3° We may wish the political balance to tilt more toward solicitude for constitutional rights as an end in itself-that is, as part of a substantive moral conception-or we may believe that protection of those rights is instrumentally important to democratic participation. Post and Siegel write, "Constitutional rights may instantiate the very values that democracy seeks to establish, and they may also be necessary to the discursive formation of popular will upon which democracy is based."
Moreover, for some -to wit, those who are systematically in the minority -the idea that certain constitutional rights must be protected above and beyond the legislative process is not obviously inconsistent with their political preferences.' This knight-gallant vision of the Court as a protector of individual rights is a historically contingent one. The Court did not by and large conceive of itself as institutionally concerned with minority rights prior to the New Deal era, and it has not generally been concerned with protecting individual economic rights since. 134. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (implying that more searching judicial review might be appropriate for "the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities" (citation omitted)).
hegemony. As Richard Primus writes, "In an attempt to ground their opposition to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, many Americans felt a need to articulate some set of normative precepts outside of and prior to positive law."' 3 s The residue of the Warren Court's commitment to that "set of normative precepts" continues to influence the contemporary conception of the role of constitutional courts in a democracy. Second, the concern for justice may be generalized to other values that the ordinary political process is not designed to protect or maximize. Judicial review might, for example, correct for risk aversion within the polity. Tom Ginsburg has proposed what he calls the "insurance model of constitutional review. ' ,, 6 The model posits that political actors engaged in constitutional design will fashion mechanisms for judicial review to guard against the risk that they will be political losers in future elections.' 37 Those incentives exist for ordinary citizens evaluating the system in place as much as for political architects designing constitutions prospectively. A risk-averse citizen who is consistently in the majority may still prefer to live within a system in which statutes require judicial approval, even if she is likely to disagree with the Court.'3 Judicial review might also help correct for variations in intensity of preferences. We can hypothesize a universe of three issues: federal habeas, the death penalty, and campaign finance. I might not feel very strongly about, but generally favor, the enforcement of state death penalty laws and the habeas restrictions imposed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 3 9 but I might vigorously oppose campaign finance restrictions such as the ones imposed by the BCRA.
140 I have legislative majorities on two of the three issues, but I will nonetheless support judicial review, and its close cousin 
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judicial supremacy, because I am in the legislative minority on the issue I care about (campaign finance). Third, the judiciary might provide a measure of predictability that people find not only psychologically attractive but also useful in arranging their personal and business affairs. Recall the FSIA example discussed earlier. Whittington's model encourages observers to view the impetus behind the statute in terms of the incentives on the State and Justice Departments. But the FSIA is also a story of interest group politics. At the hearings over the bill, Cecil Olmstead, a Texaco executive and chair of a lobbying group for transnational companies, testified that enactment of the FSIA "should substantially reduce certain risks of doing business with foreign governmental entities, reduce costly litigation over immunity issues, and thus benefit the American business community as a whole. '14 ' Similar testimony was offered by representatives of private litigants, economic policy consultants, and other business interests. 142 Citizens, especially corporate ones, cherish predictability. The courts' soft spot for settled understandings, the relative stability of the Supreme Court's membership, and the judicial commitment to consistent treatment of litigants all mean that affairs governed by courts rather than politicians are relatively likely to conform to prior expectations. to enable interest-group politics to operate in the legislative arena is supplied, in the first instance, by the procedural rules of the legislature, and in the second instance by the existence of an independent judiciary.").
In the end, much of our "support" for judicial supremacy may be inertial, deriving from an unexamined devotion to the status quo.'" Judicial supremacy is the devil we know, announced as ipse dixit in judicial opinions, buttressed by self-interested politicians, and perpetuated in high school civics classes. Tushnet in particular has suggested that the Court is not well-suited to play the ambitious role that footnote four appeared to contemplate and that liberals continue to mythologize.
14 ' Long before Dahl formalized the observation, Mr. Dooley astutely remarked that "no matther whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns."
146 If courts are so commonly instruments of the elected branches and yet lull us into deliberative complacency, is it not time to wonder whether judicial supremacy is a mistake ?' 47 What Tushnet and others keen on rethinking judicial supremacy overlook is that inertia has its own set of virtues. Whittington describes political support for judicial supremacy as a concession to the complexities of government. But life, too, is complex. Amid the chores of our daily existence, who (besides political zealots and academic lawyers) has both the time and the inclination to devote mental energy to constitutional deliberation?
Resolving constitutional issues -including the rightful place of judges within our system-is a contentious business that can crowd out other priorities and that is not conducive to cooperation. Much social science evidence suggests that individuals generally prefer not to discuss politics with those who are not like-minded, and that when they do, it can lead to resentment and polarization and can diminish overall social welfare. Matthew McCubbins and Daniel Rodriguez conducted a series of simple experiments, for example, from which they concluded that deliberation is least likely to improve social welfare when it is costly to speak and to listen to others, particularly as the size of the group increases. 49 John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse have concluded from extensive study of survey data that "people do not want to make political decisions themselves, ... [and] would most prefer decisions to be made by ... empathetic, non-self-interested decision makers."' Within the popular consciousness, judges are those decision makers. Of course, the scope of their own authority is of more than passing interest to judges. But a deep reservoir of diffuse support suggests that we are not generally bothered by potential judicial self-dealing, or at the very least that any such concerns are dwarfed by the value judges provide as delegates in matters of constitutional interpretation. As Robert Jackson wrote without the benefit of empirical support, "It is certainly easier, and perhaps wiser, to let the Justices, when they have a will to do so, work out a corrected pattern of judicial restraint than to split our society as deeply as adoption of any formula for limiting judicial power would be likely to do."' 5 ' To the extent that public support for judicial supremacy proceeds from little more than unexamined assumptions, Whittington's account may be particularly useful. His model's explanations for political support for courts do not situate presidents as mediators of citizens' risk aversion, desire for stability, or solicitude for justice. Instead, and crucially for Whittington, a president is an independent political force, linked to the political commitments of his followers but uniquely able to act as "the 'interpreter-in-chief,' who can 'make politics' by redefining the political landscape. 152 The less self-conscious the public's reasons for supporting court finality, the less we should treat politicians as mere reflectors of the public's preferences; we may assume with Whittington, in other words, that the incentives of institutional political players are indeed of independent significance. But the normal political process is not the only effective outlet for the expression of public sentiment about the judiciary, even if that sentiment is inchoate and little scrutinized. The levers of popular control over the judiciary remain a bit mysterious, to be sure, but as conditions for deliberation and the prevalence of subideal conditions in ordinary life experience. See MUTZ, supra, at 5. 56 from using state officials to help implement the Brady Act; ' 7 and from passing nationwide legislation providing a federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violence and banning gun possession near schools.' Just as many conservatives sought refuge from the individual rights decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts in a jurisprudence of original intent, some liberal academics have sought to rebut the Rehnquist Court's structural critique by resort to popular constitutionalism in all its sundry guises." 9
